Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts
share
We study a generalization of both the classic single-dimensional mechanism design problem, and the hidden-action principal-agent problem of contract theory. In this setting, the principal seeks to incentivize an agent with a private Bayesian type to take a costly action. The goal is to design an incentive compatible menu of contracts which maximizes the expected revenue. Our main result concerns linear contracts, the most commonly-used contract form in practice. We establish that in Bayesian settings, under natural small-tail conditions, linear contracts provide an O(1)-approximation to the optimal, possibly randomized menu of contracts. This constant approximation result can also be established via a smoothed-analysis style argument. We thus obtain a strong worst-case approximation justification of linear contracts. These positive findings stand out against two sets of results, which highlight the challenges of obtaining (near-)optimal contracts with private types. First, we show that the combination of private type and hidden action makes the incentive compatibility constraints less tractable: the agent's utility has to be convex (as without hidden action), but it also has to satisfy additional curvature constraints. Second, we show that the optimal menu of contracts can be complex and/or exhibit undesirable properties - such as non-monotonicity of the revenue in the type distribution.
READ FULL TEXT