Game-Theoretic Analysis of Mining Strategy in Bitcoin-NG Blockchain Protocol
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Bitcoin-NG, a scalable blockchain protocol, divides each block into a key block and many micro blocks to effectively improve the transaction processing capacity. Bitcoin-NG has a special incentive mechanism (i.e. splitting the transaction fee to the current and the next leader) to maintain its security. However, the design of the incentive mechanism ignores the joint effect of the transaction fee, the mint coin and the mining duration length on its expected mining reward. In this paper, we identify the advanced mining attack that deliberately ignores micro blocks to enlarge the mining duration length to increase the likelihood of winning the next mining race. We first show that an advanced mining attacker can maximize its expected revenue by optimizing its mining duration length. We then formulate a game-theoretical model in which multiple miners perform advanced mining to compete with each. Based on the proposed model, we compute the expected revenue of the attacker and analyze the Nash equilibrium for the mining game. We show that by adapting the mining duration lengths according to the equilibrium point of the game, these miners can increase their expected mining revenues compared to honest mining. Therefore, we conclude that miners have a great incentive to have advanced mining attack.
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