Norms for Beneficial A.I.: A Computational Analysis of the Societal Value Alignment Problem
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The rise of artificial intelligence (A.I.) based systems has the potential to benefit adopters and society as a whole. However, these systems may also enclose potential conflicts and unintended consequences. Notably, people will only adopt an A.I. system if it confers them an advantage, at which point non-adopters might push for a strong regulation if that advantage for adopters is at a cost for them. Here we propose a stochastic game theoretical model for these conflicts. We frame our results under the current discussion on ethical A.I. and the conflict between individual and societal gains, the societal value alignment problem. We test the arising equilibria in the adoption of A.I. technology under different norms followed by artificial agents, their ensuing benefits, and the emergent levels of wealth inequality. We show that without any regulation, purely selfish A.I. systems will have the strongest advantage, even when a utilitarian A.I. provides a more significant benefit for the individual and the society. Nevertheless, we show that it is possible to develop human conscious A.I. systems that reach an equilibrium where the gains for the adopters are not at a cost for non-adopters while increasing the overall fitness and lowering inequality. However, as shown, a self-organized adoption of such policies would require external regulation.
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