ObNoCs: Protecting Network-on-Chip Fabrics Against Reverse-Engineering Attacks
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Modern System-on-Chip designs typically use Network-on-Chip (NoC) fabrics to implement coordination among integrated hardware blocks. An important class of security vulnerabilities involves a rogue foundry reverse-engineering the NoC topology and routing logic. In this paper, we develop an infrastructure, , for protecting NoC fabrics against such attacks. systematically replaces router connections with switches that can be programmed after fabrication to induce the desired topology. Our approach provides provable redaction of NoC functionality: switch configurations induce a large number of legal topologies, only one of which corresponds to the intended topology. We implement the methodology on Intel Quartus™ Platform, and experimental results on realistic SoC designs show that the architecture incurs minimal overhead in power, resource utilization, and system latency.
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