PRADA: Protecting against DNN Model Stealing Attacks
share
As machine learning (ML) applications become increasingly prevalent, protecting the confidentiality of ML models becomes paramount for two reasons: (a) models may constitute a business advantage to its owner, and (b) an adversary may use a stolen model to find transferable adversarial examples that can be used to evade classification by the original model. One way to protect model confidentiality is to limit access to the model only via well-defined prediction APIs. This is common not only in machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) settings where the model is remote, but also in scenarios like autonomous driving where the model is local but direct access to it is protected, for example, by hardware security mechanisms. Nevertheless, prediction APIs still leak information so that it is possible to mount model extraction attacks by an adversary who repeatedly queries the model via the prediction API. In this paper, we describe a new model extraction attack by combining a novel approach for generating synthetic queries together with recent advances in training deep neural networks. This attack outperforms state-of-the-art model extraction techniques in terms of transferability of targeted adversarial examples generated using the extracted model (+15-30 percentage points, pp), and in prediction accuracy (+15-20 pp) on two datasets. We then propose the first generic approach to effectively detect model extraction attacks: PRADA. It analyzes how the distribution of consecutive queries to the model evolves over time and raises an alarm when there are abrupt deviations. We show that PRADA can detect all known model extraction attacks with a 100 suited for detecting extraction attacks against local models.
READ FULL TEXT