RecordFlux: Formal Message Specification and Generation of Verifiable Binary Parsers
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Various vulnerabilities have been found in message parsers of protocol implementations in the past. Even highly sensitive software components like TLS libraries are affected regularly. Resulting issues range from denial-of-service attacks to the extraction of sensitive information. The complexity of protocols and imprecise specifications in natural language are the core reasons for subtle bugs in implementations, which are hard to find. The lack of precise specifications impedes formal verification. In this paper, we propose a model and a corresponding domain-specific language to formally specify message formats of existing real-world binary protocols. A unique feature of the model is the capability to define invariants, which specify relations and dependencies between message fields. Furthermore, the model allows defining the relation of messages between different protocol layers and thus ensures correct interpretation of payload data. We present a technique to derive verifiable parsers based on the model, generate efficient code for their implementation, and automatically prove the absence of runtime errors. Examples of parser specifications for Ethernet and TLS demonstrate the applicability of our approach.
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