Social structure formation in a network of agents playing a hybrid of ultimatum and dictator games
Here we present an agent based model involving a hybrid of dictator and ultimatum games being played in a co-evolving social network. The basic assumption about the behaviour of the agents is that they try to attain superior economic positions relative to other agents. As the model parameters we have chosen the relative proportions of the dictator and ultimatum game strategies being played between a pair of agents in a single social transaction and a parameter depicting the living costs of the agents. The motivation of the study is to examine how different types of social interactions affect the formation of social structures and communities, when the agents have the tendency to maximize their social standing. We find that such social networks of the agents invariably undergo a phase change from simple chain structure to more complex networks as the living cost parameter is increased. The point where this occurs, depends also on the relative proportion of the dictator and ultimatum games being played. We find that it is harder for complex social structures to form when the dictator game strategy in social transactions of agents becomes more dominant over that of the ultimatum game.
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