The route to chaos in routing games: Population increase drives period-doubling instability, chaos & inefficiency with Price of Anarchy equal to one
share
We study a learning dynamic model of routing (congestion) games to explore how an increase in the total demand influences system performance. We focus on non-atomic routing games with two parallel edges of linear cost, where all agents evolve using Multiplicative Weights Updates with a fixed learning rate. Previous game-theoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that system performance is close to optimal in the large population limit, as seen by the Price of Anarchy reduction. In this work, however, we reveal a rather undesirable consequence of non-equilibrium phenomena driven by population increase. As the total demand rises, we prove that the learning dynamics unavoidably become non-equilibrating, typically chaotic. The Price of Anarchy predictions of near-optimal performance no longer apply. To the contrary, the time-average social cost may converge to its worst possible value in the large population limit. Every system has a carrying capacity, above which the dynamics is non-equilibrating. If the equilibrium flow is a symmetric 50-50% split, the system exhibits one period-doubling bifurcation. A single periodic attractor of period two replaces the attracting fixed point when the demand exceeds the carrying capacity. In general, for asymmetric equilibrium flows, increasing the demand destabilizes the system, so that the system eventually becomes Li-Yorke chaotic with positive topological entropy. This demand-driven instability emerges from any pair of linear cost functions. Remarkably, in any non-equilibrating regime, the time-average flows on the edges converge exactly to the equilibrium flows, a property akin to no-regret learning in zero-sum games. Our results extend to any sequence of shrinking learning rates, e.g., 1/√(T), by allowing for a dynamically increasing population size.
READ FULL TEXT