Uniform Welfare Guarantees Under Identical Subadditive Valuations
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We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents that have an identical subadditive valuation over the goods. The extent of fairness and efficiency of allocations is measured by the generalized means of the values that the allocations generate among the agents. Parameterized by an exponent term p, generalized-mean welfares encompass multiple well-studied objectives, such as social welfare, Nash social welfare, and egalitarian welfare. We establish that, under identical subadditive valuations and in the demand oracle model, one can efficiently find a single allocation that approximates the optimal generalized-mean welfare—to within a factor of 40—uniformly for all p ∈ (-∞, 1]. Hence, by way of a constant-factor approximation algorithm, we obtain novel results for maximizing Nash social welfare and egalitarian welfare for identical subadditive valuations.
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