When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of
in...
We study an information aggregation setting in which a decision maker ma...
We study a generalization of both the classic single-dimensional mechani...
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal...
Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information ...
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism de...
In the interdependent values (IDV) model introduced by Milgrom and Weber...
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communicati...
Economic theory distinguishes between principal-agent settings in which ...
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods,
...
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks – in particular
ma...
We study contract design for welfare maximization in the well known "com...
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and re...
Strategic classification studies the interaction between a classificatio...
Bayesian persuasion, as introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow in 2011, is ...
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous i...
A single seller wishes to sell n items to a single unit-demand buyer. We...
We initiate the study of computing (near-)optimal contracts in succinctl...
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, b...
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, a...
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in
combina...
We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in whi...