We explore the performance of polynomial-time incentive-compatible mecha...
In this paper we revisit the notion of simplicity in mechanisms. We cons...
We consider fair allocation of a set M of indivisible goods to n
equally...
Cloud computing customers often submit repeating jobs and computation
pi...
We study the classic bilateral trade setting. Myerson and Satterthwaite ...
In the early 20^th century, Pigou observed that imposing a marginal cost...
A common assumption in auction theory is that the information available ...
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n
age...
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items among n
...
Mechanisms with money are commonly designed under the assumption that ag...
We study a market of investments on networks, where each agent (vertex) ...
A single seller wishes to sell n items to a single unit-demand buyer. We...
We consider the problem of allocating a set on indivisible items to play...
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, b...
We consider transferable-utility profit-sharing games that arise from
se...
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets usi...
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school choice mechanism? We
e...
We study a variant of Vickrey's classic bottleneck model. In our model t...
We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit endowment effe...
We study revenue maximization by deterministic mechanisms for the simple...
The literature on "mechanism design from samples," which has flourished ...
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) sta...