In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifi...
A powerful feature in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably com...
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechan...
A menu description defines a mechanism to player i in two steps. Step (1...
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private v...
A single seller wishes to sell n items to a single unit-demand buyer. We...
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for ...
In game theory, we often use infinite models to represent "limit" settin...
We describe our experience with designing and running a matching market ...
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets usi...
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school choice mechanism? We
e...
We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple
b...
The literature on "mechanism design from samples," which has flourished ...
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) sta...
The question of the minimum menu-size for approximate (i.e.,
up-to-ε) Ba...